

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday 24 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman :

Mr. Arthur S. LAL

(India)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil :

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria :

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma :

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada :

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
\*Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. K. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. TYLNER  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia :

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETEH

India :

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MENTA  
Mr. P.M. GEORGE  
Mr. G.D. COMAR

Italy :

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

<u>Mexico</u> :	Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
	Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ
<u>Nigeria</u> :	Mr. M.T. MBU
	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland</u> :	Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
	Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. W. WIECZOREK
<u>Romania</u> :	Mr. M. MALITZA
	Mr. H. FLORESCU
	Mr. O. NEDA
	Mr. C. UNGUREANU
<u>Sweden</u> :	Mr. R. EDBERG
	Mr. P. KELLIN
	Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
	Mr. J. PRAWITZ
<u>Union of Soviet</u>	Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
<u>Socialist Republics</u> :	Mr. L.I. MENDELEVICH
	Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
	Mr. B.I. POKLAD
<u>United Arab Republic</u> :	Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
	Mr. M.H. El-ZAYYAT
	Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
	Mr. S. AHMED
<u>United Kingdom</u> :	Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT
	Mr. D.N. BRINSON
	Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
	Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United States of America :

Mr. A.E. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General :

Mr. O. LCUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General :

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India) : I declare open the seventy-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we address ourselves to the debate in which we have already been engaged, I understand that the co-Chairmen would like to make a brief announcement, and I believe that they wish me to call first on the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America) : I should like to report to the Conference that the Soviet co-Chairman and I have agreed, on the basis of the meetings which we have held during this past week, that a meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests should be held next Tuesday, 28 August. The delegation of the United Kingdom has been consulted and that date is satisfactory to it.

It is my feeling that the meetings which the co-Chairmen have held have been very useful inasmuch as all aspects of the nuclear test ban treaty have been discussed. However, I should like to make it clear to the Conference once again that it seems to us that the aim to be pursued is a clear and unequivocal obligation on the part of each State to stop testing nuclear weapons. That is an unconditional obligation. We believe that the other side of the coin ought to be equally unconditional.

I shall not go into all our reasons now because I have set them forth here in the past, but we interpret the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) -- which we welcomed and found most useful -- as meaning that once the commission has certified an unidentified event the other side, without question, without cavil and without debate, must allow the commission to come in and make an objective on-site inspection. Some of the Soviet representatives, and possibly other members of the Conference, interpret the memorandum in another way. Thus, when it is asked whether we shall take this memorandum as the exclusive basis for drafting a treaty I am afraid that our interpretation of the memorandum points north, while that of the Soviet Union points south. Nevertheless, we plan to continue our conversations with the co-Chairman and also to hold meetings of the Sub-Committee.

While we recognize that there are certain problems with respect to sovereignty which may concern any State in accepting the principle of obligatory on-site inspections in advance, we feel that if the will to reach agreement really exists we could make it clear to the world, jointly, that such a procedure does not involve any derogation of sovereignty and that, just as every international treaty is a

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commitment, so every such commitment undertaken by a State as an exercise of its sovereign power to pledge, in the first place, that it will not test any nuclear weapons, is an obligatory commitment. If it is not an obligatory commitment it means nothing. It seems to us, therefore, that it ought to be equally clear to the other side that if the commission certifies an unidentified event there should be an obligatory commitment to allow the commission to come in. We do not think this pledge in advance is any real derogation of sovereignty. We think that such a pledge rather makes a State a fuller and more responsible member of the international community of sovereign States, and we are exploring, and are quite willing to explore, with our Soviet colleagues how this can be set forth. But the one condition I do want to make clear is that the obligation to discontinue the tests and the obligation to facilitate inspections must be equally clear and unequivocal and, on the other side of the coin, the inspection must not be merely invitational or semi-invitational in its terms.

I do not wish to discuss the merits of this any more but I merely wanted to acquaint the members of the Committee with the position that, while we are having those very fruitful -- and I think useful -- discussions, this rather basic point of difference still remains between my delegation and the delegation of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) : During the seventy-second meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on 20 August, the delegations of India and the United Arab Republic requested the two co-Chairmen, who accepted, to consider practical and adequate measures which required to be taken in order to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Committee approved the proposal of the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic and adopted the following communique :

"On a joint proposal by India and the United Arab Republic the Conference requested the co-Chairmen, who accepted, to consider practical and adequate ways for a test ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.72 p.54)

When we, the two co-Chairmen, met on the following day, 21 August, in order to follow up this proposal, in accordance with the co-Chairmen's established working procedure the Soviet side suggested that the authors of the proposal should be

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invited to the meeting. The Soviet Union co-Chairman considered this proposal to be quite natural, since it would be very useful for the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic to have an opportunity of explaining to the Co-Chairmen in a more concrete and detailed manner their views on how to give effect to their proposal concerning the working out of practical measures for reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

We cannot but express our regret that the other side -- the United States co-Chairman -- contrary to the established practice, would not accept our proposal to invite the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic to attend our meeting. The meeting of the co-Chairmen took place without the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic.

During the subsequent exchange of views, the co-Chairmen considered the views and proposals put forward by members of the Committee in the course of the discussions and stated their respective positions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet side made fresh efforts to persuade the United States co-Chairman to accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as the basis for agreement.

Mr. Dean continued to insist on his earlier proposals. I have no intention now of going into the substance of this question. I must note with regret that in the course of the consultations between the two co-Chairmen no progress has been made in bringing the positions of the two sides closer together on the question of ending nuclear tests.

The Soviet delegation considers that in the circumstances the three-Power Sub-Committee should proceed without delay to work out a draft treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests on the basis of the eight-Power joint memorandum of 16 April. Accordingly, we proposed to the United States co-Chairman to submit to the Eighteen Nation Committee a recommendation to the following effect :

"Considering the need to accelerate the solution of the problem of the cessation of all nuclear testing, the three-Power Sub-Committee should proceed without delay to work out an appropriate draft treaty on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States of 16 April."

Mr. Dean did not support this proposal.

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In reporting to the Committee on the meeting of the co-Chairmen, the Soviet delegation would like to say that it will continue to try to use all ways and means for the urgent solution of the problem of banning all experimental nuclear explosions.

We are, of course, prepared to continue in future our meetings with the United States co-Chairman, as we consider these meetings useful for finding acceptable ways of reaching agreement on the question of ending nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America) : One very brief word. In the past, when we have been drafting a substantive proposal and any delegation has submitted a written suggestion for amendments to that proposal, or if any member of any delegation has said that he would like to be invited to the meetings of the co-Chairmen while they were considering the drafting of a particular proposal, we have agreed. On a previous occasion the representative of Italy had suggested that the two co-Chairmen should not attempt to by-pass the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. That seemed to be the sense of the meeting. The Sub-Committee was one of the bodies set up under the terms of our working procedure, and those bodies are allowed to arrange their own meetings without having to obtain the plenary Conference's approval of the time at which those meetings are to be held.

When my co-Chairman proposed that we should invite the representatives of India and of the United Arab Republic, I then suggested that we should also invite the representatives of Brazil and of Mexico, who had also offered suggestions, and, in the sense that the United Kingdom was a member of the three-Power Sub-Committee, that it should be invited as well, but it seemed to me that, since the question had been raised, perhaps the matter of who should be invited ought to be referred back to the plenary meeting. That, however, was not satisfactory to my co-Chairman and so that was the way the matter was left.

However, I would like to make it clear that, speaking for myself, I am always very happy to hear the views of any of the members of the Conference. The only thing that occurred to me the other afternoon was that, since it seemed to me that this was more a procedural than a substantive matter, if we started to invite two of the members of the Committee and did not invite the others there might be ill feeling. That is the basis on which I suggested that we should refer the matter back to the plenary meeting.



Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French) : With regard to the participation of the co-sponsors of the memorandum in the work of the nuclear Sub-Committee, I should like to mention that the Western delegations --- and the Italian delegation in particular -- have expressed the wish and proposed on more than one occasion that the eight representatives should be invited to take part in certain meetings of the Sub-Committee, and that the reason why this has been impossible has always been the opposition of the Soviet delegation.

I venture also to put a question to the two co-Chairmen : Do they think that the Sub-Committee might report back to the Conference and, if so, when ?

The CHAIRMAN (India) : There is a question for the two co-Chairmen. Apparently they would like to answer it later as I do not see any great readiness to answer it at the moment. Perhaps we should let them reflect on it, if the representative of Italy agrees; and we can now proceed with our list of speakers as it was before we were enlightened on this matter by the co-Chairmen. I am sure we should all like to thank them for having told us what has been happening between them.

Mr. NASKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French) : Before proceeding with my statement, I should like to thank those colleagues who welcomed me on my return to Geneva and paid tribute to Mr. Lachs on his departure.

In our previous discussions on general and complete disarmament much time has been devoted to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In itself, this is a fact to be welcomed. The abolition of these literally murderous weapons is indeed of decisive importance for the execution of a programme of general disarmament.

During the discussion a number of valuable statements and inferences have been exchanged, particularly concerning the strategical implications of fulfilment of this condition. That has doubtless helped to clarify positions. We have, however, witnessed a number of attempts to divert the debate into channels not calculated to advance the abolition of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. I am thinking particularly of the two working documents presented by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/53 and ENDC/54). Far be it from us to dispute, in general, the importance of technical problems. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that to engross ourselves in the details of these problems and, still more, to concentrate on them before there is any agreement on the substance, increases the difficulty of bringing our positions nearer together.

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Of the present problem we have unfortunately to admit that there remains a fundamental divergence of view about the way it should be approached. There still exist two opposing attitudes : one in favour of radical measures which would practically remove the danger of nuclear war in the first stage; the second summed up in proposals appearing to offer a gradual solution but in reality doing no such thing, since they do not reduce, even partially, the threat of a nuclear war.

The second position was defended on 22 August by the United States representative, Mr. Dean (ENDC/PV.73, pp. 11 et seq.); it had previously been defended, on 1 August by Mr. Stelle. According to Mr. Stelle a 30 per cent reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of disarmament would have the following effect :

"The nuclear arms race would be stopped and turned down; similarly, the capability of conducting war by conventional means would be diminished."

(ENDC/PV.64, p. 31)

The facts, however, refute this claim. Nuclear weapon stocks would in fact remain intact and the danger that they might be used would not be diminished, since 70 per cent of their means of delivery would remain. Mr. Dean, moreover, admitted this when he said that the United States proposals do not eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a reduction of 30 per cent in nuclear weapon vehicles could diminish capacity to wage war with conventional arms.

Praising the alleged virtues of the American proposals, the United States representative displays the blindness of a nurse who praises her sickly charge to the skies. When he is dealing with the Soviet proposals, he takes quite another tone. He does all he can to discredit the Soviet plan, for, he says, this plan does not lay down strict limits between nuclear weapon vehicles on the one hand and conventional weapons on the other, and furthermore, he says, it guarantees no effective control. It is only too clear that such statements are without foundation.

In his turn, Mr. Dean described what he believes would be the disastrous consequences of abolishing all nuclear vehicles in the first stage;

"... to eliminate virtually all categories of major armaments leading, as my delegation has pointed out, to almost total disarmament in stage I with very little left over for stages II and III." (ENDC/PV.73, p. 14)

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We see that, in advancing these objections, the United States delegation is contradicting its own case : that to carry out the Soviet proposals would lead to an imbalance. For if the effect of the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles were really, as Mr. Dean says, "to eliminate virtually all categories of major armaments" -- including, therefore, conventional armaments, the field in which the United States fears Soviet superiority -- what would remain of these United States fears which the alleged imbalance would produce ? Really, gentlemen !

This attitude to the Soviet proposals does not, however, prevent the United States representative from asserting that there are certain similarities between the Soviet proposals and those of the United States. According to Mr. Stelle, these similarities are :

"First, it seems to us that both sides have as an ultimate objective the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible. Secondly, both the United States and Soviet plans propose to accomplish this by a series of reductions of those armaments which contribute to a State's capacity to wage such a war." (ENDC/PV.64, p. 33)

To impute such objectives to the Soviet proposals is to distort their content. To take the first item, the Soviet plan aims not at the reduction of vehicles but at their complete abolition, for no percentage reduction in these weapons would make nuclear war impossible. There is no such "point" as the one the United States representative speaks of, except zero.

On this question we share the opinion of the Indian representative, Mr. Lall, who said on 8 August :

"We cannot agree that the ultimate objective is the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible. I think we must all agree that, in this matter, we must stay with the terms of document ENDC/5 -- which was negotiated and agreed between the two delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States of America originally, and was then endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations -- which in this connexion says that there must be elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction." (ENDC/PV.67, p. 30)

A like remark applies to the second alleged similarity, for as is well known the Soviet proposals call for the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first

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stage, and not for a series of reductions which would preserve the possibility of using nuclear weapons throughout all the stages of disarmament. We have said many times that we are in favour of seeking points of agreement in the positions of the two sides. But we are not in favour of creating an illusion of similarity where no such similarity exists, as this does not facilitate a genuine agreement.

One cannot deal with nuclear weapon vehicles in lots. The nuclear weapon must be rendered innocuous by being abolished. In the same way as one cannot fight an epidemic by eliminating only some of the potential germ carriers, so one cannot eliminate the threat posed by the nuclear weapon except by entirely destroying its vehicles' capacity for harm.

In this connexion, I should like to draw attention to the position adopted by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, at the sixty-seventh meeting.

Mr. Godber stated :

"Apart from the safeguards of the most complete verification there is in fact no physical defence on which we can rely, and nothing indeed, until an adequate United Nations peace force has been established, to protect us except our defence through deterrents. That is what we have to rely on in the early stages of the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.67, p. 11)

Thus, independently of the process of disarmament, we must, according to Mr. Godber, pursue the policy of deterrence, which is intrinsically at variance with the nature of disarmament. How, then, can one speak of complete verification extending to weapons stocks not subject to destruction, if at the same time one proposes to pursue the so-called method of deterrence ? This method, indeed, increases the danger to the extent that particulars of the other side's defence system are disclosed.

The concept of what is described as zonal control is based on the principle of complete verification extending to the weapons remaining in national arsenals, in other words on the principle of prior control. An analysis of the United States plan shows that after the first stage of disarmament -- a stage in which, as we know, conventional weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles would be reduced by 30 per cent while bases on foreign territory would remain -- there would be established 100 per cent control of areas comprising one-third of the territories of States. Further, by leaving the United States bases on foreign territory, a situation would be created in which the United States would have every possibility of carrying out strategic redeployments of these bases.

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In these circumstances, what could prevent the United States from concentrating its nuclear weapon vehicles precisely in these bases ?

It is clear that such a so-called "balance" would suit the book of only one of the parties and would constitute a flagrant threat to the security of the socialist countries. The arguments put forward by Mr. Dean at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.73, pp.18-19 ) do not invalidate these facts, nor the conclusions they entail.

On 22 August, the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, asked why the control procedure envisaged in the Soviet draft for the third stage could not be applied to the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles (ibid., p. 9 ). The answer is very simple. After the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles, although these are a weapon of basic importance, there would still remain in national arsenals a considerable military potential the disclosure of which by 100 per cent control would jeopardize the security of the parties.

Amongst the important problems which events have shown to be in no way academic, is one which might be called that of the "conventionalization" of nuclear weapons, that is to say, the tendency to treat these weapons as though they were conventional weapons; there is also that of the increasing number of States possessing nuclear weapons.

I have above all in mind the well known aspirations of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The essential character of these aspirations is not changed by the fact that, in view of the growing opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, schemes are being devised -- and not only in the Federal Republic of Germany -- to arrive indirectly at a position in which Western Germany will be able to share in the control and disposition of nuclear weapons, for example by the creation of a so-called multilateral nuclear force.

We must stress that the equipment of armies with nuclear weapon vehicles constitutes a stage in this process of encouraging aspirations to the spread of nuclear weapons. It is sufficient to recall that in March 1958, during the first debate in the Bundestag on the equipment of the Federal Republic of Germany with nuclear weapons, German Government representatives put forward the argument that it would meet the need for modernization if "only" nuclear weapon vehicles and not the nuclear warheads were placed at the disposal of the German Federal Republic. I do not wish to enter now into matters concerning this problem as a whole and its significance for the security of Europe in particular. I shall confine myself to pointing out that in 1962 the official

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representatives of Western Germany pose this question without even that degree of moderation which they felt obliged to show a few years ago.

The tendency displayed by Western general staffs to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons, the attempt to deny that there is any fundamental qualitative difference between nuclear and conventional weapons, are highly disturbing facts. The tendency to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons is not at all an unimportant question. That is why Mr. Dean's remark that the question of the "conventionalization" of nuclear weapons is a "proverbial 'straw man' which can easily be blown down" (ENDC/PV.73, p. 14 ) must give rise to apprehension.

One need only glance at the numerous speeches of Mr. Strauss, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, and his generals, and at the statements of well-known American strategists, to convince oneself that this is no question of a "straw man".

We could give numerous examples, but I shall content myself with one. This is what Mr. Strauss said in his speech at Georgetown University, Washington, on 27 November 1961 :

"We are moving towards a situation in which the possession and control of nuclear weapons is the symbol, the characteristic sign, the deciding criterion of national sovereignty." (Die Welt, 28 November 1961)

The tendency to spread the possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a weighty argument in favour of the correctness of the demand of the socialist countries that these vehicles should be abolished 100 per cent during the very first stage of disarmament.

Mr. ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia) : Before I make my statement I should like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of my delegation to the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Poland and Romania as well as to the Swedish representative. They have already made important contributions to the deliberations of this Committee and I am sure that their continued contributions will greatly assist the Committee in the discharge of its responsibility, as the contributions of their predecessors, whose departure we all regret, have done.

On the question of the agenda, five months have elapsed since the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference started its work. The greater part of that time has been spent in explanation of the two disarmament plans of the United States and of

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the Soviet Union by their authors and their respective associates. We have adopted a method of work (ENDC/52) to deal with the actual drafting of a disarmament treaty and on this basis we are now studying pertinent articles, paragraphs and subparagraphs in the two plans with a view to harmonizing them or bringing them together, as appropriate, to constitute the treaty which we have in mind. Time and effort have been given unsparingly both by the two co-Chairmen and by the Committee to accomplish that worthy task. But whether notable progress towards that common goal has been made so far or whether some prospect of such progress is in sight is another matter. All that I can say on behalf of my delegation is that the time and effort spent so far in explaining the two positions and the two plans based on such positions, as well as in trying to reconcile the differences between the two plans, have not been spent in vain. The many fine and elaborate statements made by the representatives of both sides in these lengthy meetings and the efforts made by the two co-Chairmen and by the Committee to bring the two plans closer on the basis of the method of work which we have adopted have without doubt their useful and helpful aspects. For example, they have helped us to see and to appreciate the complex situation more clearly than ever and they have, I believe, enabled us to assess -- on the basis of the experience we have acquired -- what may and may not be conducive to the achievement of the great objective which we all seek, namely, general and complete disarmament.

It is on that particular point -- that is, the assessment of what may and what may not be conducive to the achievement of the objective sought -- that I wish to say a few words today.

Let me, therefore, deal first with what my delegation believes may not be conducive to the achievement of the objective we have before us. As I have said, we have adopted a procedure of work for the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. According to that procedure articles, paragraphs and subparagraphs in the plans of the Soviet Union and the United States dealing with disarmament measures for the first stage of general and complete disarmament would be taken up together, first at plenary meetings, then by the two co-Chairmen, and then again at plenary meetings, with a view to bringing the positions together and agreeing on the texts of appropriate articles which ultimately should constitute the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

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That procedure has been scrupulously followed. The two co-Chairmen in particular and the Committee have been working hard to bring the two positions closer together. Many interesting and stimulating statements have been made; arguments and counter-arguments in support of one or the other position have been adduced; suggestions, proposals and amendments to paragraphs and articles of the two plans have been offered; and even some agreements on procedural and non-substantive points have been reached. But what of the substantive points? The substantive points are still there. They are there, as far apart as ever. They are there, each in its stronghold of single and double brackets, perhaps more unapproachable and more unassailable than ever.

That seems, at least to my delegation, to be the situation today. What of the future? Can the procedure which we are at present following possibly lead us to any fruitful result in the future? Can the suggestions, the proposals and the amendments to these individual articles, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs which are being offered possibly bring the two irreconcilable positions any closer together? Or would the continuation of the present procedure of work be a mere waste of time and effort, promising no fruitful results at all? Those are questions to consider very seriously if we are to discharge in a responsible and conscientious manner the great task with which we are entrusted.

As far as we in the Ethiopian delegation are concerned, we feel that the procedure and the method of work we have adopted will not possibly bring us any nearer even to narrowing down the basic differences between the two positions on major issues of substance, let alone to reaching agreements and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We may be wrong, and I hope we are wrong; but that is how we feel about it.

The reason we feel that the method of work we are following will not bring us any nearer to the objective we seek is the following. The two plans, those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which we are trying to bring together in appropriate articles of stage I of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, are based on two totally different concepts of disarmament; or, rather, the two plans are based on two totally different positions adopted by the two sides in regard to disarmament. The position of the United States and its Western allies is that disarmament measures in regard to certain types of armaments and their production should be carried out, in the first stage, on a percentage basis; while the position



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of the Soviet Union and its allies is total elimination of such types of armaments and total stoppage of their production, as well as the dismantlement of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops. I should like it to be clear, at this point, that I am not in any way, even by implication, passing a judgement on the merits of the two positions. I am only trying to stress the fundamental difference between the two positions, which is relevant to the point I wish to make today.

The two plans, therefore, including the articles, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs in each plan, which are based upon and naturally flow from these two different positions, will always remain, in our view, far apart and irreconcilable, until and unless an agreed, common position in regard to disarmament measures, for the first as well as for subsequent stages, has been adopted. In the humble opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, no amount of suggestions or amendments to their individual paragraphs and/or articles could possibly bring the two plans any closer, as long as the positions of the two sides in regard to disarmament measures to be effected in the first and subsequent stages remain totally different as they are now. To try to bring the two plans, which are founded as they are on two inherently different and independent bases, together for the purpose of agreeing on common treaty texts would be something like -- the Committee will excuse me for using these terms -- trying to marry two males.

Small suggestions or amendments to individual paragraphs or articles cannot change the nature of the two plans. The two plans are the natural and logical results of the two fundamentally different approaches which the two sides have adopted on disarmament. Any and all efforts must, therefore, be exerted to reconcile the wide differences in principle which exist between the two approaches or concepts adopted by the two sides in regard to disarmament, instead of our wasting our time in amending paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, which cannot lead us anywhere except to the inevitable impasse when we come to points of substance.

This brings me to what, as I said a moment ago, my delegation feels may be conducive to fruitful results; and in this connexion I should like to refer to my statement of 3 August, when I said :

"I recognize the enormous difficulty involved in trying to disengage the various tangible and intangible factors that are tangled and tied up together. But I think that that difficulty has been increased as a result of lack of a common criterion for the establishment of an order or sequence for the various measures of disarmament to be included in the first and subsequent stages.

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"The two plans submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union seem, as I have said, to have adopted different approaches to disarmament in the first stage -- that of the United States a percentage approach and that of the Soviet Union a qualitative approach, if I may say so -- but they do not carry the process to its logical end." (ENDC/PV.65, pp. 11-12)

Then I went on to say :

"In the humble opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, no balance could be established and maintained for the disarmament measures to be undertaken in the first stage, or for those to be delayed to subsequent stages, if either of the two approaches were to be adopted as it is. Nevertheless the Committee might adopt as a criterion either the percentage or the qualitative approach to disarmament for the first stage if it were to be modified." (ibid., p. 12)

And I said later in my intervention :

"It is the considered opinion of my delegation, therefore, that a decision on such a common criterion is a necessary prerequisite for any fruitful discussion, and especially for the discussion and elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ibid., p. 13)

I reiterate that statement today and, on behalf of my delegation, I stress the importance of reaching a decision on an agreed common approach to disarmament. As I have said, such an approach could be a percentage approach, a qualitative approach, or something in between, but a decision in principle on such a common approach must be made if the time and efforts we spend here, now or in the future, arguing and re-arguing endlessly and with no hopeful result in sight are instead to be spent usefully, intelligently and with result.

As we all know, the decision taken by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the agreed principles (ENDC/5); which have formed the solid basis for disarmament negotiations, cut through and put an end to often unnecessary and interminable debates and polemics which had gone on for many years both within and outside the United Nations, and greatly narrowed the vast gap which had existed theretofore between the two sides in regard to the question of disarmament. One more step in that direction, one more agreement in principle on whether the percentage, the qualitative or some other approach should be adopted in regard to disarmament measures for the first stage in particular and for subsequent stages would, I am sure, carry us very much nearer to our goal.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

I know that the time left between now and the opening of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, to which the report on what we have done here will be submitted, is a short period in which to expect a decision to be reached, as I have suggested, on such a basic question. I know, too, that such a decision would have to be taken at the highest level of the governments concerned, after due consideration of all the attendant circumstances, and that that in itself would require time. But would it not be possible to exchange our views on it now and to follow it up at the next session of the General Assembly? Such an exchange of views here and in the forth-coming Assembly session on the possibility of taking a decision in principle regarding an agreed common approach to disarmament such as I have indicated would give the governments of the two sides food for thought -- if I may be permitted to use the expression -- and might make it possible for their representatives to come back when this Conference reconvenes, if not with new plans prepared on a common basis, at least with instructions to discuss the possibility of establishing such a common basis.

I have already said that the discussions held in the present session, characterized as they were by fewer recriminations and polemics than in the past, have been very useful and constructive. But in our view they would have been more useful and more constructive had they been focused on one objective -- that is, on the determination of a common approach to the disarmament measures to be undertaken in the first and subsequent stages. All the statements and arguments put forward here by both sides would have been more useful and more constructive had they been directed strictly to a well-stated and attainable purpose. Continued arguments and counter-arguments intended primarily to clarify situations can sometimes end by confusing such situations further and creating fresh difficulties. That generally happens when there is no stated purpose towards the achievement of which such arguments are directed, or when the stated purpose, if there is one, offers no possibility of achievement. I am afraid that we seem to be in such a situation at the present time. Because our stated purpose -- namely, the drafting of treaty articles from two plans based on two irreconcilable positions -- offers no possibility of achievement, all the arguments adduced by the two sides seem to have passed over the points which might clarify the issue and to have tended more and more to confuse that issue and to create fresh difficulties. We have listened to many elaborate

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speeches and strong arguments from the representatives of both sides, all magnifying the differences and the difficulties involved; each side rejecting the position of the other side as absolutely unacceptable, but nobody indicating the way to remove such differences or difficulties.

In fact, if we were to draw conclusions from the arguments adduced so far by the two sides, only two would appear possible : first, that each side would agree to sign a disarmament treaty only if the other side accepted its terms; or, secondly, that because of the difficulties so vigorously expounded by both sides no agreement at all could be reached. I know that is not the intention and the aim of the two sides; I am only trying to show how the unattainability of a stated purpose would tend to direct continued arguments to a point of absurdity.

My delegation sincerely believes that it is high time we considered the problem from another angle. We must try to establish an agreed common approach to disarmament measures for the three stages. Until such an agreed common approach has been established I am afraid that no amount of suggestions, proposals or amendments to individual paragraphs and articles of the two plans, which are based on two diametrically opposed concepts and approaches, will carry us anywhere. They would only bring us to the roadblock of the substantive question, where we have to stop, after all the time and efforts we have expended so far -- and will perhaps be expending in the future if we continue with the present method of work. In the opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, the sooner we clear that roadblock out of our way the faster we shall be able to advance towards our goal.

To sum up my remarks, I would suggest that the two sides, and particularly the great Powers, should be requested both here and at the forthcoming General Assembly : first, to enter into consultations among themselves with a view to agreeing in principle whether a qualitative, percentage or any other approach should be adopted as a criterion for measures of disarmament, in the first stage in particular and in subsequent stages, and to submit their respective plans based on such an agreed common approach to this Conference when it reconvenes; and second, to agree -- if, as I have just indicated, between now and the reconvening of the Conference agreement in principle cannot be reached on a common approach or criterion -- that this Conference, when it reassembles, should direct its discussions to determining such a criterion instead of continuing the examination of the articles in the present two plans.

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

My delegation fully shares the view of those other delegations which wanted the forthcoming recess of this Conference to be as short as possible, and we hope that when we reassemble we may be able to start our work with an agreed common basis to guide us speedily to our goal, otherwise, in our view, a short or long recess may not make very much difference.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) : In the course of our discussion on the disarmament measures of stage I relating to the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, many constructive suggestions have been made. In particular, a new contribution to our work was made today by the head of the Polish delegation. We have also listened with interest to the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia. He expressed views that are deserving of attention. We shall study both these statements.

The course of the discussion has clearly revealed the desire of the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers to switch the consideration of this most important measure of stage I to a discussion of the details of control, including the details of so-called selective zonal inspection. This is shown by the statements of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, at the last meeting of the Committee.

In this connexion we deem it necessary to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that real success in the disarmament negotiations can be achieved only if the questions which we discuss are dealt with in their proper sequence, in their natural relationship to one another.

The only correct way is to seek agreement on the substance of the disarmament measures and, as and when such agreement is reached, to work out the appropriate control measures.

It cannot be doubted that if we reached agreement on the disarmament measures -- in this particular case, on the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets -- it would be much easier to agree on how to verify in practice the fulfilment by all States of their obligations in regard to this disarmament measure.

At the same time it is difficult to imagine how any agreement on control can be reached without first deciding in what consist the disarmament measures, whose implementation it is intended to control. To reach agreement on control without determining the disarmament measures subject to control is tantamount to putting the

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cart before the horse, as they are fond of saying in the West. But we cannot approach the problem of disarmament and control from such a position -- we cannot consider control without disarmament. Our long and bitter experience shows how much time we are wasting on fruitless discussions on control, forgetting about disarmament.

It is in virtue of these considerations, the validity of which hardly anyone will venture to question, that the Soviet delegation proposes that we should make the utmost efforts in the first place to reach agreement on the substance of the disarmament measures -- in this particular case disarmament measures relating to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. What are the respective positions on the sides on this question and what is the objective meaning of these positions?

In the discussion on the disarmament measures of stage I in regard to nuclear delivery vehicles, two basically different points of view came into conflict. One of them was put forward by the Soviet Union, which proposes to eliminate in stage I all means of delivery of nuclear weapons without exception -- all types of rockets, military aircraft, surface warships capable of being used as nuclear weapon carriers, all submarines and artillery systems which can be used as a means for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. Simultaneously with the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, all foreign military bases must be dismantled and all foreign troops must be withdrawn from alien territories.

Our proposal ensures serious progress in the main thing which the peoples of the world are impatiently waiting for, namely, the real strengthening of peace and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war in the very first stage of disarmament.

At the same time the elimination of all delivery vehicles of any range -- and I emphasize "any range" -- would not give anyone any unilateral military advantage, since by the end of stage I all States would be equally deprived of any practical possibility of using nuclear weapons.

For the Soviet Union which now possesses well-known superiority over the Western Powers in the field of the most perfected intercontinental and global rockets, the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I would mean that the Soviet Union would be deprived of this military advantage. However, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to this for the sake of accelerating agreement on general and complete disarmament.

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The United States has adopted and is maintaining in the course of the debate a fundamentally different position on the question of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, particularly long-range intercontinental means of delivery. The gist of its proposal is that delivery vehicles would not be eliminated completely in stage I but reduced by 30 per cent. These means of delivery would remain throughout the second and third periods. What can be said about this proposal :

In order to understand more clearly the present position of the United States on this important question it will be useful to recall earlier United States proposals in this regard. When it became known that the Soviet Union had achieved great success in the field of building intercontinental rockets and was ahead of the Western countries in this respect, the West, and in the first place the United States, showed great concern and considerable nervousness, because the territory of the United States, which had been invulnerable in the past, now became vulnerable. This made it much more difficult for the United States to carry out its aggressive plans in regard to the peace-loving States. Since then proposals of the United States have been aimed at unilaterally depriving the Soviet Union of this powerful defence weapon, namely long-range ballistic rockets. This can easily be seen by studying the proposals in this regard submitted by the United States in 1957. In this connexion I will remind you of the proposal of 12 January 1957, submitted at the eleventh session of the General Assembly. It was proposed at that time, as a first urgent step, that all experiments with intercontinental ballistic missiles should be subjected to international inspection, this inspection being understood, of course, in the sense advocated by the United States.

In the proposals submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on 29 August 1957 it was proposed as an immediate task to co-operate in setting up a technical committee to study the organization of an inspection system which would make it possible to ensure that the launching of objects through outer space would be carried out exclusively for scientific and peaceful purposes.

What was the purport of all these proposals ? They had only one purport, namely, to place the most powerful defence weapon of the Soviet Union under the control of the Western Powers and to weaken the defensive potential of the Soviet Union. At the same time the Western Powers would in fact leave their own armaments untouched.

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Of course such "proposals", openly aimed at undermining the defensive potential of the Soviet Union and its allies, could not be accepted.

In the course of subsequent negotiations the Western Powers, though in a more veiled manner, attempted again and again to achieve the same objective. The proposals set out in the United States plan are also aimed at this.

First, it is easy to see that these proposals would not reduce, even to a slight degree, the threat of a nuclear war, since it would also be possible to strike a nuclear blow by means of the remaining 70 per cent of missiles, bombers and other nuclear vehicles retained by the various States. Therefore, the United States proposal does not meet the demand of the peoples for the speediest elimination of the threat of a nuclear war; it is not aimed at improving the existing situation in the world.

Secondly, the proposal to reduce the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by 30 per cent in stage I, if considered in the context of the United States position in regard to stage I as a whole, turns out to be aimed at gaining for the United States itself certain unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union and other socialist States and all peace-loving States; it is aimed at changing the strategic balance of forces to the advantage of the United States.

This is evident in the first place from the fact that, while proposing a 30 per cent reduction of each type of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle and, consequently, a reduction by approximately one-third of the most perfected intercontinental and global Soviet rockets which are the basis of our defence, the United States does not say a word about the dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territory which are located on the circumference of the countries of the socialist camp -- the very same bases at which the shock nuclear forces of the United States are deployed, namely medium and long range missiles pointed towards the Soviet Union. We are being asked to reduce by one-third the potential might represented by our most powerful weapon, while the other side would leave intact its potential might for striking a blow at the Soviet Union. This becomes even more obvious in stage I in which the United States proposes a further reduction by 35 per cent of what we had in the beginning and, consequently, a further substantial reduction of intercontinental and global missiles, and in this stage it again says nothing about the dismantling of foreign bases in alien territory. The same picture can be seen in stage III as well.

What are we to call all this? We cannot but come to the conclusion that first of all this is an attempt, however veiled, to outwit the Soviet Union and to place its



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security in jeopardy. Secondly, we cannot avoid the conclusion that this is nothing but an attempt to protect the territory of the United States against a counter-attack, to make it invulnerable and at the same time to preserve for the United States every possibility of launching a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and its allies, using its European partners in NATO and the American military bases located around the Soviet Union for this purpose. If we take into account the intention of the military staffs to obtain information about the location of the Soviet rocket bases in order to strike a preventive blow against such bases, we get a complete picture of the plans prepared by the United States strategists. As you see, these are not new plans; they are for carrying out the aggressive designs of the United States mainly by making use of its European allies in NATO, while remaining as far as possible on the side-lines, and untouched. It is obvious that while, under the United States disarmament plan, the number of intercontinental rockets would be gradually reduced, medium and long range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would gain in importance, as would also strategic air forces. In these circumstances, the danger of a retaliatory blow by the peace-loving States that had been attacked would involve mainly the European allies of the United States, those countries on whose territories the United States military bases are located and from which aggression is being planned. Is this not what Washington wants?

These are the conclusions to which our analysis of the United States proposals has led us. I realize that you, Mr. Dean, do not agree with these conclusions. But you cannot refute them. We have been appealing for a long time to the United States delegation and to the delegations of other NATO countries to state their views on this question. The refusal to dismantle foreign military bases on alien territory, in the first or even the second stage of general and complete disarmament, unmasks the United States plan completely.

The discussions in our Committee have shown that no serious arguments have been found, nor could they be found, in support of the United States' proposal for a so-called 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery. The Western delegations have been unable to refute our conclusion that this proposal contributes nothing from the point of view of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. In fact, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, has made no secret of this. He himself admitted it at the meeting of 22 August when he said that

"the United States' proposals, as I have said, do not claim to end the nuclear threat in stage I" (ENDC/PV.73, p. 13).

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That is quite true. Only it is necessary to add that it does not at all appear from the plan of the Western Powers that they intend to eliminate nuclear weapons at any time.

The logical conclusion from an objective analysis of the disarmament proposals submitted to the Committee for consideration is that foreign military bases must be eliminated simultaneously with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Without this there can be no disarmament.

Therefore, the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery in stage I cannot be taken as a basis for further negotiations.

I should like to say a few words on certain arguments which were put forward against our proposal for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I. The representatives of the Western Powers opposed to the Soviet proposal first and foremost the argument that complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would upset the existing strategic balance in favour of the Soviet Union and would place the Western Powers in a strategically unfavourable position, because the Soviet Union, in their opinion, would have superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces. In his statement of 22 August, Mr. Dean again repeated this assertion and even said of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I, and I quote :

"... for the free world that would mean defeat, and for the Soviet Union it would mean victory." (ENDC/PV.73, p. 12)

I must confess I fail to understand how anyone can say such a thing. Does Mr. Dean assume that the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war would be a defeat for the United States? We thin, otherwise, and we are convinced that the people of the United States, no less than the Soviet people and the other peoples of the world, are concerned that the threat of thermo-nuclear extermination should no longer hang over humanity like a sword of Damocles. We have no doubt that the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war will be regarded by the people of the United States, as by the people of any other country, not as a defeat but as a victory in a just cause.

As regards the gist of the question of strategic balance, it has been demonstrated in the meetings of this Committee with facts and figures, including those taken from Western sources, that the implementation of our proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I neither would nor could result in any

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advantage in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments for the Soviet Union and its allies. Even if we do not take into account the armed forces of the United States, which, by the end of stage I under our proposals, would be located exclusively within their national territory, just as the armed forces of the Soviet Union would be, still the Western Powers would in any case have in Europe, not less troops than the socialist countries, but even slightly more.

In our opinion, however, it is wrong to discount altogether the United States troops, although they would be located on the other side of the ocean from Europe. It is an objective and indisputable fact that, in the conditions prevailing at the end of stage I, the United States would be in a position to transfer its troops to Europe in the event of a military conflict more quickly than it would be possible for the Soviet Union to bring in Soviet troops stationed in Siberia and the Far East. Above all it is necessary to take into account that both sides would be in exactly the same position, in the sense that neither would be able to prevent the other from transferring its troops. Since the Soviet Union would have no rockets, no military air force worth mentioning, no submarines, no powerful surface warships, it would, of course, have no means of using force to prevent the transport of United States troops to Europe; similarly, the United States would have no means of preventing the Soviet Union from moving its armed forces from the remote parts of Siberia and of the Far East to the more western parts of our country. Consequently, in this respect there would be complete equality between the two sides.

This means that the question as to which country would be able to transport its troops more quickly would be decided above all by the concrete factors, such as : the carrying capacity of railways, the speed of trains, the necessary number of troop trains for the transport of military units, the speed of ocean liners, their capacity, and so on.

Allow me, gentlemen, to put forward some considerations in this connexion. Let us take first the distance which the troops of one or the other side would have to travel, if they had to be transferred to the theatre of an eventual conflict in Europe. The distance from the east coast ports of the United States, where they would embark, to the landing ports on the Atlantic coast of France and other European countries is roughly 6,000 kilometres. The distance from such cities in Siberia as Chita or Irkutsk -- not to mention more distant towns -- to the western boundaries of the

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Soviet Union is more than 7,000 kilometres. In other words it is somewhat greater than the distance which the United States troops would have to travel to reach Europe.

Now, at what speed can troops be transferred along these routes? Specialists tell us that when it comes to transporting troops across the Atlantic -- and this was stated in our Committee -- the big ocean liners, each of which can carry roughly a division, will reach the French ports within five or six days at the outside. Cargo vessels carrying the arms and the supplies for these divisions, will, apparently, take at the most eight or nine days to cross the Atlantic.

Now let us see what the situation would be with regard to the transport of troops by rail from areas of Siberia and the Far East. Specialists tell us that the speed of troop transport by rail can hardly exceed 500 to 600 kilometres a day. That was confirmed in particular by the experience of the Second World War, when the average rate of movement of troops trains across the territory of the Soviet Union was even lower than this. This means that in order to cover the 7,000 kilometres -- not to speak of longer distances -- the troops will need fourteen days; in other words, roughly twice the time necessary to transport troops across the Atlantic. We must also remember, however, that it is impossible to load a whole division into one train, that several trains will be needed for each division, and the speed of movement of the trains westward will necessarily depend on the operating capacity of the railway lines and stations, the need to keep certain intervals between trains despatched from the entrainment points and so on.

As you see, gentlemen, transferring troops by rail, far from being simpler, is a more complicated and comparatively more lengthy business than transferring troops across the ocean, all other things being equal. There is no escaping this conclusion: it is an objective fact. That is why we wish to emphasize once again that the Western delegations have absolutely no grounds for their assertions about certain advantages of the Soviet Union over the United States in regard to transferring its troops to the area of a possible conflict in Europe at the end of the first stage of general and complete disarmament. If this is so, what grounds can there be for asserting that our proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I would place the United States in a strategically unfavourable position?

In the course of our discussions the Western Powers, have also advanced some other far-fetched arguments against our proposal, alleging that it is impossible to separate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from convention armaments, that it is

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impossible within the proposed period of time to eliminate all means of delivery, and they have raised a number of other technical points.

In the course of the discussions, the Soviet delegations has dwelt at length not only on the substance of its proposals, but on many of the details. In particular, we explained how in our view the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be carried out in practice. I should like to ask all the representatives here whether it will really be so difficult to prepare and agree on a procedure for eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and on the technical details of such elimination, if we agree to implement this measure. Of course, technical problems will arise, but they will undoubtedly be solved successfully by the technical experts. One thing can be said: it is considerably quicker to destroy a weapon than to build it.

In this connexion we should like to recall that in the working documents submitted by the United Kingdom (ENDC/53 and ENDC/54) we find explained in considerable detail how to implement in practice the elimination, for example, of military rockets or aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

At our meeting of 3 August the Soviet delegation said that the corresponding propositions of the United Kingdom working paper no doubt deserved our full attention and might prove to be useful at an appropriate stage in our negotiations (ENDC/PV.65, p. 45); but the point is that we have not yet come to that stage, and it has not been reached owing to the position of the Western Powers who refuse to come to an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. But, as a matter of fact, the United Kingdom working papers prove the point, that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is quite possible and feasible.

Thus, it is not at all a question of the details of how we should eliminate, but of what we should eliminate. The Western Powers do not want to agree to the elimination of all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and of all foreign military bases, because they are anxious to obtain certain unilateral strategic advantages to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union and of all peace-loving States.

In order to deflect our attention from this main question, everything is being done to concentrate our discussions on the question of control. This device is well known to us. Many times during the seventeen years of negotiations since the end of the Second World War, as soon as we reached the point of considering concrete disarmament proposals, the opponents of disarmament immediately brought the question of control to the fore, and led the whole business into a deadlock.

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In view of the fundamental importance of this question, I should like to go into it in a little more detail. In what way is it proposed to work out control measures for the elimination of delivery vehicles and the implementation of other disarmament measures? The Western delegations want to consider control questions in complete isolation from real life and from the political situation in which we find ourselves, and separately from the disarmament measures. There are attempts to devise schemes of control in the abstract, and abstruse, dry mathematical computations are made, while the political aspects of the problem are ignored. But the security of States will depend on what system of control is adopted and implemented. Therefore, we cannot shut this important problem into a bell-glass, isolated from the surrounding world.

Perhaps such training exercises in control matters might be useful for improving the skill of the experts, but at the present stage they obviously do not and cannot move our work forward.

When it comes to serious political questions, particularly those which have a direct bearing on the most vital interests of States, namely, their national security, it is impossible to work in the abstract. They must be considered in a specific context, taking into account the actual situation which exists in the world. We cannot prepare disarmament plans, we cannot consider and solve problems of control in isolation from the international situation in which such plans will have to be carried out. It is self-evident, as we have said before, that the problems of control are inextricably bound up with the disarmament measures themselves.

Mr. Dean tried to convince us at our last meeting that everything is serene in the world, that the United States wants business-like and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, and has no aggressive intentions. Of course, if this were the case, the Soviet Union could only rejoice. Expressing the thoughts and feelings of Soviet people in this connexion the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said on 10 July 1962 :

"The Soviet Union is for peace and friendship among all nations. Our Government has instructed me to declare from this rostrum that the Soviet people want to live in peace and friendship with the industrious and gifted people of America. The Soviet and American peoples have no grounds for hostility to each other. Peace and friendship are in their common interest. The Soviet people call on the American people, just as they do on all other peoples, to work together for these noble aims." (ENDC/47, p. 36)

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Obviously, in that case, the problems of control also would appear in a different light. However, in reality, the situation is not as Mr. Dean described it. Although he assures us of the peaceful intentions of the United States Government in regard to the Soviet Union, official representatives of the United States at the highest level make statements of a different kind, namely, about the possibility of the United States taking the initiative in unleashing a nuclear conflict against the Soviet Union. These statements are echoed by a large army of American correspondents who are trying to accustom millions of simple folk in the United States to the idea that sooner or later the United States will unleash such a conflict.

The well-known American columnist, Alsop, recently wrote :

"The increase of nuclear striking power means that we are now creating a deterrent force which could be used for a first strike".

There are many such pronouncements in the United States press. But, as you know, it is not only a matter of words. The general staffs of the Western Powers, members of NATO, are preparing detailed plans for striking at the vital centres of peaceful countries. In the governing bodies of NATO, the question is under discussion of putting atomic weapons at the disposal of this aggressive bloc and, as an inevitable consequence, they would fall into the hands of the Western German militarists and revanchists, who proclaim as the main aim of their policy the revision of the frontiers between States in Europe.

So there turns out to be a double or even a triple game in this question. In Geneva, they assure us of their good intentions, while the general staffs in Washington and in the capitals of the allies of the United States in military blocs are at the same time accelerating their preparations for war. In exposing the essence of these tactics of the United States Government, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said in his speech at the All World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace on 10 July 1962 :

"Last spring the United States Government sent three delegations abroad. One of them went to Geneva, another to the session of the NATO Council in Athens, and the third, the most numerous, to the area of Christmas and Johnston Islands to supervise nuclear tests. Which of the three delegations reflects most clearly in its actions the real essence of United States policy ? Obviously the second and third. The Geneva delegation is just a sort of cover." (ENDC/47, p. 21)

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So, in elaborating control measures, one cannot ignore the state of the relations between States and the degree of confidence between them. I should like to suggest to you, gentlemen, representatives of the NATO countries, that you should break away from abstract research, and look at our earth as it is, in all its variety, and, taking this into account, draw up such plans and work out such steps as would really lead here and now to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and not take us further away from it. The Soviet Union stands for the most effective international control over all disarmament measures. But it is firmly opposed to control at any stage of disarmament being used for other purposes -- for collecting intelligence data.

In the light of what I have said, a legitimate question arises -- does the present situation, as well as the interests of control over disarmament, justify the opening up of the territory of peace-loving States for comprehensive control before the beginning, or from the very beginning, of the disarmament process? In the circumstances, where the peace-loving States are being threatened with preventive nuclear war and preparations are being carried on to this end, the Soviet Union and its allies must, of course, have a particularly cautious attitude towards questions of control. Even in these circumstances, however, we are prepared to agree to the consistent implementation of the principle that the volume of control measures must correspond exactly to the volume and type of disarmament measures. This in itself would ensure the establishment of strict international supervision of the elimination of armed forces and armaments at each stage of disarmament.

What specifically are our proposals for control over the implementation of those disarmament measures which we are now discussing, over the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I? The Soviet proposals stipulate that during the implementation of measures to eliminate all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall verify on the spot the destruction of rockets, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines, and artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons. They will have the opportunity to verify the conversion to peaceful uses of all plants engaged at the present time in the production of rockets, bombers, submarines and other means of delivery. The international inspectors will be at the sites for the launching of rockets for peaceful purposes, in order to be present at their launching and to inspect thoroughly each rocket, each satellite, each space ship, before they are launched.



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The international inspectors will have the right of access to launching pads for rockets, to aerodromes, to stores of the means of delivery in various areas of the countries concerned, including the Soviet Union. Governments of the States parties to the treaty must afford all necessary facilities to the international inspectors to enable them to carry out, without difficulty, the responsible duties entrusted to them in exercising control over the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

At present, of course, the negotiations have not reached the stage where we would count exactly how many international controllers and inspectors there will be in the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and all the other countries, for the purpose of exercising control over the elimination of means of delivery. But even at this stage, it is possible to say quite definitely that for this purpose there will be required not a few persons, nor even dozens of persons, but a far greater number.

Thus, gentlemen, you have concrete proposals before you which are intended to ensure real control over the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. A State which has given its agreement to such far-reaching control cannot be suspected -- if one is objective -- of being against control or against a business-like approach to this question.

We envisage also other measures of control in the first stage : the establishment of control over the dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territories, over the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories, over the reduction of the levels of the armed forces of States, over the reduction of conventional armaments, of armaments production, and so on. We realize that in this case we are taking a certain risk. If, however, this will allow us to reach a solution to the problem of disarmament we are ready to accept such a risk.

Implementation of the first stage measures, and the actual elimination by the end of this stage of any possibility of unleashing a nuclear war, would considerably strengthen confidence between States, would bring about the assurance that their security rests on a firmer foundation. In these circumstances it would be possible to agree to a considerable extension of control in the second stage, and to place under international control the entire atomic industry of States, while at the same time carrying out the destruction of all nuclear weapons under strict international control. New teams of international inspectors would appear at all plants producing

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raw material for atomic weapons and also at those producing the weapons themselves. It would not be a question of one or two plants, nor of one or two regions. How is it possible to accuse a State which proposes such measures, of not co-operating in a business-like manner in the field of control?

By the beginning of the third stage confidence would be strengthened even more, the threat of war would become minimal and, during the course of the third stage, control would gradually become comprehensive.

That is our approach to the question of control. Those are our proposals.

The Western Powers refuse to accept our proposals on control and to discuss them in a business-like way. As in the past, they are still setting against these proposals their demand that States should from the very outset of disarmament open up the whole of their territory and disclose their entire system of defence. At various times this demand has been given different forms: now it is being put forward in the form of so-called selective zonal inspection.

No great perspicacity is needed in order to understand the significance of the demand for the opening up of the territories of States before disarmament. Control before disarmament is control over armaments, that is the complete disclosure of the entire defence system in the circumstances where not a single practical step towards disarmament has been taken, the arms race continues and the threat to the peace-loving States is being intensified. In these circumstances to disclose the whole defence picture and to indicate the location of vital centres would mean encouraging the advocates of the policy "from a position of strength" and incite them still more to make preparations for an attack on peace-loving countries. The advocates of control over armaments at one time tried to maintain that thorough knowledge of the entire defence system and military strength of the other side would help to avoid miscalculations and would even be a "restraining factor". Would it not be more correct to consider that such an approach incites the advocates of the use of force for settling disputes to have recourse to this method? There cannot be any doubt that such an approach would never lead to disarmament; it would be more likely to speed up the arms race.

In fact, after the armed forces and armaments of the other side had been ascertained in detail, there would inevitably arise the desire to have everything which the other state has and moreover in larger quantities and of a better quality.

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The assertion that the demand for the disclosure of the defence system before disarmament serves the purpose of strengthening confidence does not stand up to criticism. It is obvious that such a demand in the present circumstances can only give rise to distrust and put us really on our guard. Everyone knows how the incursion of the United States reconnaissance aircraft U2 into the territory of the Soviet Union in May 1960 helped to strengthen confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States !

In short, in the demands for control before disarmament, in the proposals for open skies and "blue prints" the hand of the military staffs of the NATO States showed up so clearly that the Western Powers decided in future to camouflage this policy to some extent and to make it somehow presentable. They tried to do this by putting forward the demand for the establishment of so-called control over remaining armaments --- over those armaments which would remain at the disposal of States in the first and subsequent stages of disarmament. But did this really change anything ? It did not. The gist remained the same. There was still the same demand for the establishment of unlimited control over all armed forces and armaments of States throughout the territories of these States. This could only play into the hands of a potential aggressor working out plans for a military attack.

However, it soon became obvious that the demand for control over remaining armaments blocked any prospect of success in the negotiations on disarmament and that the responsibility for the lack of progress in this important matter lay with the Western Powers. Then they set about yet another manoeuvre, a further attempt to make their approach to control questions less objectionable in the eyes of world opinion, while leaving the gist of it intact. It was then that selective zonal inspection appeared on the scene, which is now being presented as something new, as something different from the earlier proposals of the Western Powers on the question of control. At the meeting on 22 August 1962 Mr. Dean even asserted that the proposal of the Western Powers for selective zonal inspection was intended to allay the anxiety of the Soviet Union in regard to the possibility of control being used for intelligence purposes.

We do not agree with this assertion. In fact, the proposal for selective zonal inspection still reflects the same approach from the position of control over armaments, that is to say, legalized international espionage.

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Analyzing the proposal for so-called selective zonal inspection the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, in his statement of 10 July 1962, said with good reason that this proposal --

"... looks like a ruse for discovering all the arsenals of our national security -- that is to say, to throw open the doors to a reconnaissance and espionage system and thus make things easier for a potential aggressor. The so-called zonal inspection provided in the United States 'outline' also pursues an obvious aim, which is to establish the exact sites of Soviet rocket and nuclear installations. In this case we may say, paraphrasing an American expression, that the reconnaissance tail wags the policy dog." (ENDC/47, pp. 13 and 14)

What do the Western Powers demand in practice under the pretext of establishing selective zonal inspection ?

First and foremost, they demand that in the very first stage at least 30 per cent of the territory of States should be opened up for unimpeded control, and control not only over the destruction of armaments but over remaining armaments. The authors of zonal inspection say : We no longer insist on the whole territory being opened up immediately; we are prepared, you see, to make concessions, to proceed step by step, gradually. But what does this 'gradualness' mean when applied, for example, to the Soviet Union ? It means that they are trying to get the Soviet Union to open up in the first stage no less than 7 million sq. km. of its territory ! Did the authors realize what this meant ? Probably not. But I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to this. We are being asked to open up in the first stage a territory equal in area to the whole territory of the United States. Yet Mr. Dean also said that the idea was to inspect "only a certain portion of the territory of a country" (ENDC/PV.68, p. 15).

How can one speak of a special, 'gradual' approach in carrying out selective zonal inspection if, according to the previous demand of the Western Powers for the opening up of the whole territory of States for control, we would also have to begin with something ? We cannot imagine -- the Western Powers also realize this of course -- that on the very first day of disarmament an army of inspectors would immediately swarm over the territory of the Soviet Union and all its districts and regions. Even then it would start with the "occupation", figuratively speaking, by inspectors of those regions first of all which are of particular interest to the intelligence agencies

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of NATO. What change has been made, since the United States is now asking us to open up in the first stage not the whole of our territory but only 30 per cent ? Just about none.

Further, the United States outline envisages such a system of selecting zones for inspection as is calculated to ensure for the Western Powers unimpeded penetration precisely into those regions of the Soviet Union where they would like most of all to penetrate. The United States outline states :

"Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone." (ENDC/30, p. 14)

It states further :

"The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it." (*ibid.*)

What does this mean ? It means that even before the beginning of disarmament the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries would have to declare how many rocket launching sites are located in each zone in their territory, how many depots of nuclear arms, airfields and other military objectives, how many divisions of ground troops are stationed there, how many submarines equipped with rockets are based in the ports of coastal zones, and so forth. The general staffs could then easily select those zones which are of the greatest interest to them and in the course of inspection ascertain the exact location of all military objectives. Here you have, in fact, the whole disingenuous machinery of reconnaissance under the plausible pretext of selective zonal inspection.

If one also takes into account that it is proposed to do all this in the circumstances where the United States and its allies of the aggressive military blocs would retain at their disposal 70 per cent of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, all their military bases on foreign territory and all their stocks of nuclear bombs, missiles and warheads -- then the picture will be complete. Obviously, we cannot agree to a proposal which is aimed, not at disarmament, but at undermining the security of peace-loving States.

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Perhaps someone who has not fully understood the real gist of selective zonal inspection might say that we exaggerate, that we are obsessed by an 'espionage complex', as has been stated here, and that it does not at all enter into the intentions of the Western Powers, and especially of the United States, to uncover the system of defensive installations in Soviet territory in order to prepare military plans against the USSR? The answer to this question can easily be found if we turn to the statements made by United States statesmen.

We all know, in particular, the statement of Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense, on the so-called 'counter-force' strategy which would justify dealing a nuclear strike against the most important military objectives of the other side.

Behind such statements are very important things. In the West no secret is made of the fact that the nuclear strike planned by Mr. McNamara against military objectives can be of the greatest strategic value only if it is a first strike. After all, no great results can be achieved by dealing a nuclear strike against airfields from which the aircraft have already taken off or against submarine bases from which the submarines have already departed on military operations. On the contrary, one may calculate that a nuclear strike against military objectives would be most effective if the rockets, aircraft, and submarines of the other side remain at their bases, if they have not been sent into action, that is to say, if the other side has not started military operations. Whichever way you look at it, the counter-force strategy is a translation into military terms of the policy of unleashing a preventive nuclear war.

In order to carry out Mr. McNamara's counter-force strategy, it is necessary to know the exact location of the military objectives of the other side. This was most clearly stated by Mr. Kissinger, the adviser to the President of the United States on strategy, who has been quoted here more than once. But, I think it appropriate to do so again. In his article on "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense", published in the July 1962 number of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kissinger said this :

"For one thing, if a counter-force strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true in the case of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives."

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Further on, Mr. Kissinger pointed out in this connexion that the information available to the United States Intelligence at the present time about Soviet launching sites was likely to be fragmentary. This was said by the adviser to the President on strategy. This was not said by the Soviet Union.

The well-known United Kingdom expert on questions of nuclear physic and nuclear strategy, Professor Blackett, writing in the weekly New Statesman, said recently that the proponents of the counter-force strategy were striving for the maximum superiority in the number of nuclear bombs and the maximum invulnerability of their own nuclear delivery system and also for the maximum intelligence about the enemy's nuclear system. He also said that a successful nuclear attack of this nature would require first-class operational intelligence about the enemy's nuclear system and air bases. This is why the Western Powers require selective zonal inspection as a means of finding targets on the territory of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States which are of interest to their general staffs. The organic link between the policy of a preventive nuclear war -- of the aggressive strategy of counter-force -- and the proposals of the United States for control over remaining armaments, including proposals for selective zonal inspection, thus becomes clearer than ever.

The dangerous nature of the Western Powers' proposal for selective zonal inspection is obvious. It is no coincidence that the representative of Sweden, Baron von Platen, analyzing the problem of control over disarmament, said the other day -- and I shall have to quote once again :

"The United States delegation, however, may ask why I do not envisage right from the beginning some application of the ingenious zonal inspection plan". -- He found a good word "ingenious" and continued : "In short, my answer is that I doubt the advisability of introducing such methods during an early stage of disarmament as they seem to imply some risk of not fulfilling the criteria dealing with non-divulgence of military secrets which are legally admissible." (ENDC/PV.71, p. 32)

That is the situation in regard to the selective zonal inspection which the Western Powers wish to impose on us.

What general conclusion can be drawn from the discussion on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and on control over the implementation of this measure, a discussion which has continued during eight meetings of the Committee ? The conclusion is that it is not the fault of the Soviet Union

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that no progress has been achieved so far in settling this most important question of the first stage of general and complete disarmament. This is not a pleasant conclusion to draw and we do so with great regret. But we must look at things as they are and not try and gloss them over. It is impossible to carry on serious negotiations otherwise.

In the next few days, during the meetings of the co-Chairmen, the United States delegation will have another opportunity and indeed more than one, to reconsider its unconstructive position on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament and on the question of control over this measure. I should like to hope that on this important question the United States will adopt a position in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples and will approach the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union in an unbiased manner.

Mr. DEAN (United States) : I listened with the greatest interest to the exceptionally interesting statement by the representative of Ethiopia. I fully realize that it must be quite disappointing that we have not made further progress in those matters to which he referred, but I think we must remember that disarmament itself could be used as a part of the balance of power. It is a very complex matter to get rid of arms, which man has had from the dawn of history, in such a way as not to create imbalance during the process of disarmament. Although there are differences -- serious differences -- of opinion between the Soviet Union and ourselves concerning our respective plans for disarmament, I do submit that each of us has put forward plans for the working out of disarmament. We are now discussing how we are going to carry out those plans in detail and what the differences are, and I submit that that is necessary, because if we skipped all the questions we are now discussing and went straight to disarmament we would be merely postponing questions which we are now trying to work out in advance, even though these discussions must seem somewhat boring and complex.

I listened this morning, as always, with the greatest attention to the long and very interesting statement by the representative of the Soviet Union. I must say that I am very disappointed that I cannot convince him that the United States is not planning a pre-emptive nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union, and that he still seems to cull bits and pieces from various reports which attempt to prove the contrary.



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I might just point out to him that on the very day on which we were all congratulating him here on the very remarkable exploit of the two Soviet cosmonauts and he was assuring us that it was solely and only for peaceful purposes Marshal Malinovsky was warning the United States that it meant that the Soviet Union was in complete control of space, that it could shoot down all our missiles and that it could easily put weapons of mass destruction on vessels orbiting in outer space which could cross and recross the United States in a matter of minutes; that each of those vehicles could be armed with weapons of mass destruction which could annihilate not only all the United States but the entire population of the United States in very short order. I suppose that each of us, if we wished to do so, could quote from our military figures, but would that get us very far in our efforts to work out a constructive programme for general and complete disarmament? I submit that it would not.

I should like to reply at some later date to the very interesting statement we have heard from our Soviet colleague. Meanwhile, before I come to my own planned statement for this morning, let me mention two matters. It seemed to me that our Soviet colleague was using figures from the furthest Soviet points and the nearest United States points. I can hardly believe that the Soviet Union, particularly in view of its treaty of alliance with Communist China, would concentrate all its forces in the Far East. I would like to ask my Soviet colleague if I have understood him correctly, and if what the Soviet Union is really doing is put forward a commitment to keep all the Soviet Union's armed forces in the Kamchatka Peninsula if the United States were to withdraw all its forces from Europe.

I should like also to point out to Mr. Kuznetsov that he is quite wrong in saying that the United States does nothing about bases in stages II and III. On the contrary, if he will look at page 24 of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30) he will see that we provide that even before the treaty is signed an annex will be worked out and will come into existence defining the bases to be eliminated in stages II and III. That will be found under the heading "D. Military Bases and Facilities".

I should like to say to him again what I have said many times -- that the people of the United States have a tremendous admiration for the Russian people, that we wish to live in peace with them, that we have absolutely no desire for war with them or with anyone else and that we do hope that we can concentrate on trying to work out a useful and effective plan for disarmament which can actually be carried out. But

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sometimes, when I listen to statements such as the one we have heard this morning, I wonder. However, I suppose we had better concentrate on the forward-looking and practical parts of our disarmament work and not get too upset about those statements of what the Soviet Union could do to the United States if it chose.

Today I should like to begin my discussion of sub-paragraph 5 (c) of the agreed procedure of work (ENDC/52) which includes disarmament measures relating to conventional armaments and to such allied questions as the production of these armaments and appropriate measures of control. I should like to discuss in an ordered progression the question of conventional armaments as a part of the problem of the reduction of all armaments. My statement today will be concerned with the reduction of armaments; my later statements will consider the problems of production and verification.

I will begin my remarks by touching on certain of the problems common to all armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, which I previously discussed under point 5 (b). Following a discussion of the more general factors, I intend to review the question of conventional armaments as set forth in the United States draft plan (ENDC/30, p.4), to compare certain sections of the Soviet treaty (ENDC/2 and Add.1,2) with the United States draft treaty outline, and to discuss a number of the unanswered questions about the Soviet draft treaty which my delegation has discovered in the course of examining it and in listening to statements about it here.

I think it is amply clear from our discussions during recent weeks and my statement on 22 August (ENDC/PV.73, pp. 16 et seq.) that my delegation regards any discussion of conventional armaments as closely linked to the problem of the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. The position enunciated by my Government on this matter is essentially twofold. First, it remains our belief that in order to maintain balance during disarmament all armaments, both conventional and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, defined by type, should be reduced across the board throughout three clearly defined stages of a treaty. Second, we consider that no meaningful distinctions can be made in practice between what are clearly nuclear delivery vehicles and what are purely conventional armaments.

On the basis of the reduction of all major armaments by delegation consented to discuss separately the two kinds or classes of armaments -- nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional arms. Why did we do that? We did it in order to move the work of this Committee as rapidly as possible towards agreement. I must stress

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once again, however, that up to this point we have found no clear means of distinguishing in all cases between these types of armaments. So far we have found no way to separate clearly all arms of one class from all arms in the other. I believe the problem has become quite evident during the course of our discussions.

Before passing on to the more substantive part of my remarks this morning, I should like to summarize briefly what seems to me to be the progress we have made thus far in our discussions. We have made some progress in defining and proposing solutions to the question of reduction, production and verification of all armaments in a treaty. At the same time I would be lacking in candour if I did not indicate the specific problem areas which, through lack of clarification or because of major substantive differences, so far prevent our reaching fundamental agreement.

First of all, my delegation believes that the Soviet Union took a useful and perhaps a potentially important step by accepting the principle of percentage reductions with respect to conventional armaments. However, despite that potentially important step, the Soviet Union has so far not yet chosen to apply the principle to the reduction of all armaments across the board to assure adequate balanced reduction. Rather, its present position, I submit, tends to distort the application of the principle of percentage reduction. That distortion tends as result to make the process of reduction more complex and more difficult to apply during the several stages of a treaty. My delegation continues to be hopeful that the Soviet representative will accept the principle of percentage reduction for application across the board by type to all major armaments.

Leaving aside for the moment the problem of strategic balance, which I will discuss shortly, I should like to point out that it is extremely difficult for my Government to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposal to reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by 100 per cent during stage I while reducing conventional armaments, of which the Soviet Union clearly has the preponderance, by only 30 per cent. Now, why is this true? It is true because the Soviet Union has consistently refused to outline in precise detail exactly how reductions would be effected, and we have also not been told how and when verification measures would be applied during the initial and subsequent steps of stage I of the Soviet plan. Both those clarifications would be necessary to understand how the Soviet plan would ensure that balance was in fact maintained throughout the reduction process and that agreed levels of armaments were not exceeded during any stage of the treaty. Therefore,

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I endorse the words of my United Kingdom colleague who, when commenting on the lack of clarity of the statement made by Mr. Zorin that 100 per cent elimination of armaments means 100 per cent verification, said on 8 August :

"He has thrust this problem upon us : then he should help us to study it."

(ENDC/PV.67, p.6)

I should like to say at this point that I also fully support the statement made by Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, at our sixty-third meeting (ENDC/PV.63, pp. 13 et seq.) and that made by Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, at the same meeting (*ibid.*, pp. 51-52) concerning the imbalances which would be created by the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear delivery vehicles during stage I.

In the first place, it is really essential to my mind that the representative of the Soviet Union should explain to this Committee, as he has so far failed or been unable to do, just how military balance would be maintained under the Soviet plan. In particular, he should tell us how that balance would be maintained in the face of, first, the large preponderance which the Soviet Union has in tanks and other conventional arms and, secondly, the fact that large homogeneous national forces operating on interior lines have clear, and possibly decisive, strategic and tactical advantages over forces widely dispersed and consisting of many different national elements. Despite our many efforts to encourage the representatives of the Soviet Union to provide us with reasoned answers to those questions, to date we have been greeted with silence. Our success in getting our Soviet colleagues to answer must be rated at zero. We should like to have the answers not because we feel that they will merely point up some weaknesses or other deficiencies in the Soviet plan, but because we must know what the Soviet Union believes to be true about these issues and problems in order to carry on truly meaningful negotiations in depth, as we wish to do.

There is a second fundamental point of importance, which we might call the definition problem. I refer here particularly to the matter of dual-capable delivery vehicles which, because of design or other inherent capabilities, are equally able to deliver a nuclear or a conventional weapon. We have shown during our discussion that modern technology has made possible the delivery of either a nuclear or a conventional weapon by virtually all of the delivery vehicles which are set forth illustratively in the stage I categories of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30, section A, pp. 4-5). That same capability is undoubtedly present in a substantial number of Soviet delivery systems as well. It would be remarkable if that were not true. If we

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were thus to accept the Soviet position, all vehicles "capable" of delivering a nuclear weapon -- in the most literal sense of the word "capable" -- would be destroyed during stage I of a treaty.

As a result, it is perfectly clear that the Soviet plan would require the elimination of virtually all significant conventional armaments during the first stage. We cannot believe that the Soviet Union seriously entertains a proposal for general and complete disarmament during the first 24-month stage of a treaty. To do so would be openly contrary to point 4 of the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5), which provides that disarmament should be implemented in an agreed sequence by stages until completed. Besides, we just do not think that that is possible.

In addition, it seems possible that some of the confusion and differences separating the positions of the Soviet Union and my Government could be dispelled if the representative of the Soviet Union would make good the promise made by Mr. Zorin to this Committee during its first meeting at this resumed session (ENDC/PV.57, p.23). I refer, of course, to the promise to prepare a detailed listing of basic types of conventional armaments which, the Soviet Union proposes, will be subject to destruction during stage I. To date, the Soviet Union has not presented its proposed list of conventional armaments, nor has it responded to the request of my delegation to prepare a detailed listing of all types of armaments. Such lists would serve to clarify for the Committee the distinctions which, the Soviet Union maintains, clearly exist between nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments. My delegation is prepared to engage in a thorough discussion of this matter with the Soviet Union at an appropriate time.

Let me turn now to a more precise consideration of conventional weapons. As I said in my opening remarks, in this and in future statements I propose to discuss the three principal aspects of this topic, namely, reduction, production, and verification. Clearly, these basic aspects of the problem of drafting a treaty are not peculiar to a discussion of conventional weapons, but apply to all weapons of all sizes and types. Therefore, my remarks this morning will, of course, be applicable equally to all those armaments which are enumerated by category and illustrative type in the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30, pp.4-5). First of all, with respect to the reduction of conventional weapons, let me review briefly the United States as a basis for comparing and contrasting them with the respective Soviet proposals.

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Pages 4-7 of document ENDC/30 indicate that specified parties to the treaty would reduce by 30 per cent each type of armament listed in the ten categories of stage I of the United States draft treaty. Those parties to the treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the international disarmament organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date. The reduction of conventional armaments would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. Thus, one third of the reduction to be made during stage I, for example, would be carried out during each step.

Specifically, the United States plan calls for the depositing of one third of the armaments to be eliminated during stage I in depots under the custody of the international disarmament organization during the first part of each step. The armaments deposited would be destroyed during the second part of each step or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The actual location and number of key posts and all arrangements respecting their establishment would be agreed by the parties to the treaty.

During stage II of the United States proposal (ENDC/30, p.20), those parties to the treaty which had reduced their armaments in agreed categories by 30 per cent during stage I would agree to reduce each type of armament listed in the ten categories of stage I by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of stage I. Those parties, however, which had not been subject to measures for reduction of armaments during stage I would submit to the international disarmament organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of stage II. Such parties to the treaty would then reduce during stage II the inventory of each type of specified armaments by 65 per cent in order that those parties would have reduced by the same total percentage at the end of stage II as had the parties to the treaty who began their reduction in stage I. In addition, all parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of stage II of the additional types of armaments listed in the eight stage II categories of the United States outline treaty. Those parties would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 50 per cent. Also, specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in stages I and II of the United States outline draft treaty would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

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Finally, under the terms of the United States stage III proposal, the parties to the treaty, subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens, would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II.

The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

Thus, I think it is perfectly clear to this Committee that the United States proposals for the phased reduction of conventional as well as all other armaments is quite explicit with regard to the beginning and end of reductions in each step of each stage. It also meets the test of balance throughout the reduction process, thus preserving the essential national security of all nations. Finally, it provides satisfactory conditions which permit the verification necessary to ensure that retained armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage of the treaty.

My delegation has examined in some detail the recent Soviet amendments to its draft treaty (ENDC/2/Add.1) concerning conventional armaments. Certain questions have arisen from our examination of that document which we sincerely hope the Soviet Union will be able to clarify for us. We, of course, wish to know, as I have pointed out in past statements, what types of armaments, including conventional, military equipment, munitions, means of transport and subsidiary equipment in units and depots, the Soviet Union believes should be subject to reduction. Also how does the Soviet Union intend to ensure that arms and premises converted to peaceful uses will remain so converted in practice? In addition, we are unsure about exactly what method of reduction the Soviet Union proposes -- that is, how the reduction process will be carried out. Answers to these questions will go far to making clear for our delegation the full meaning of the amendments to the Soviet treaty, and without those answers, we submit, the amendment is not very meaningful.

Allow me next to examine several aspects of the United States proposal with respect to the reduction of conventional weapons as well as other armaments. Certain of these aspects are points on which the Soviet Union to date has again failed to make full response or to be at all forthcoming with its explicit alternative proposals.

First, let me review my Government's position that all armaments subject to reduction, including conventional weapons, ought to be reduced across the board, rather than as under the Soviet plan in which only certain kinds of weapons are reduced, while others, that is nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, are eliminated

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entirely. I think that by now it is well understood by this Conference that the application of across-the-board reductions of all armaments best preserves the relative military balance throughout the entire disarmament process. There is another way of describing the rationale of the United States position regarding the importance of an across-the-board percentage reduction of all major armaments. The United States assumes that each country at the present time is free to arrange its own military forces and armaments any way it chooses. So far as we know there are now no restrictions, except for such internal matters as budget, population, resources, and geography, on what armaments a nation can produce, in what quantity, and how they should be deployed, except in so far as any nation has voluntarily placed a limit on itself.

It should be possible to assume, therefore, that at any given time the military situation between the United States and the Soviet Union is in approximate balance. In one sense, of course, that is not completely true, because in an arms race changes are being made every day in a nation's military posture. That is why our efforts must be directed at halting the race and turning the armament spiral downward. However, we can say that at least each side has used its resources to develop what, for itself, means the optimum type of military establishment that can be devised in present circumstances. But since, as far as we know, neither side will stop by itself, we must and can work with the military situation at any given moment. If this assumption is correct -- that at any given moment the military situation of the two sides is in near balance -- then it ought to follow that a disarmament agreement should begin at a fixed point in time and that that reduction should proceed across the board in an effective and verifiable way to zero. In that manner we will, while steadily reducing quantities of arms towards zero, keep the pattern of the military machine which each party has chosen to develop. We will avoid the tremendous problem of negotiating a new composition or mix of forces for each party.

The acceptance of this idea of across-the-board reductions would, therefore, go far to prevent serious imbalances of military power arising during the early and most crucial stages of a treaty. Another important reason why my delegation so strongly supports the principle of across the board reduction of all armaments is, of course, that the amount of disarmament that is taking place during any given time is related to the capability of the established verification machinery to supervise it adequately.



(Mr. Dean, United States)

My second point concerns my Government's position that during stage I only major armaments, and not all armaments, should be subject to reduction. I discussed this question at our sixty-first meeting (ENDC/PV.61, pp. 12 et seq.), and I think it is perfectly clear to my colleagues that there are several practical and realistic reasons for my Government's position. Let me consider the more important reasons. First of all, there is the practical difficulty of making sure that all armaments specified for reduction during the first stage of the treaty do not impose unreasonable burdens on the newly created verification machinery.

My delegation supports the cautionary remarks made recently by our United Kingdom colleague at the sixty-eighth plenary meeting, when he said that the international disarmament organization will initially come to its task without adequate precedents, that its inspectors will have virtually no experience, and that there will be no certainty of the effectiveness of any verification scheme until considerable experience has been acquired (ENDC/PV.68, p. 45).

One of the strong points of the United States proposal seems to me to be that adequate time is provided during each stage either to prove the validity of our proposal or to permit necessary adjustments in procedures while not seriously upsetting existing military balances. Under present circumstances we find it difficult to agree to the reduction of further types of conventional, as well as other, armaments in stage I, because the proposal of the Soviet Union does not provide adequate verification of reductions and retained armaments during stage I. Let me point out, however, that my delegation is quite willing to listen to any criticisms that any representatives may have on its present position on the total number of armaments that should be subject to reduction during stage I. Of course, any significant changes to present United States proposals for reduction of armaments during stage I could be considered only after a clarification of the Soviet proposals for verification of those armaments, particularly the very small armaments which have been left to stage II in the United States proposal.

The final point I should like to make this morning was discussed in statements made recently by my colleagues, Mrs. Ryrdal of Sweden (ENDC/PV.55) and Mr. Burns of Canada (ENDC/PV.50), who said that serious consideration ought to be given by this Committee to the impact on the smaller Powers of the requirements in both the Soviet and United States proposals to reduce conventional weapons during each of the three stages of the treaty. That is an important point. We must not forget, indeed, that the requirement to reduce armaments across the board on the part of the many smaller

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Powers, both here and outside this Conference, will very likely present a somewhat different set of problems from those confronting the major Powers. Therefore it is the belief of my delegation that we should delay no longer a detailed consideration in this Conference of the manifold problems that will arise and the solutions which can be proposed with respect to the reduction of conventional and other armaments by all parties to a treaty during stages I and II.

Permit me to highlight the major considerations affecting primarily the smaller Powers which might be examined in detail in this Committee. Under the terms of the United States outline draft treaty only specified parties to the treaty would be required to reduce their armaments by specific type within illustrated categories during stage I (ENDC/30, p.4). Our proposal frankly recognizes that any number of conditions might exist whereby some smaller parties to the treaty during stage I would be excluded from the requirement to reduce all their major armaments by 30 per cent. This might be related, for instance, to the size and composition of a particular nation's armaments. I have noted, however, that the Soviet draft treaty seems to require that all parties to the treaty would reduce at least their conventional armaments by 30 per cent during stage I without regard to the circumstances existing at the time the treaty went into force.

Since the problem of conventional armaments is of more real concern to the smaller Powers themselves, I would propose that the study of the question could be handled as follows : that, since this is a study requiring much detailed analysis of the many factors involved, and inescapably affects all nations represented in this Conference, we might set up a working committee to consider all aspects of the problem and report as necessary to the plenary Committee. Perhaps other representatives may have different suggestions, but it does seem to me that this is an important matter and that it ought to be considered.

In conclusion, I should like to point out our belief that the Soviet Union's plan its draft treaty outline for the reduction of conventional armaments -- does require very substantial elucidation. It is far from clear on the questions of production and verification, as I will point out in a subsequent statement. Nevertheless, some progress has been made by this Committee in the area of conventional armaments and it is the hope of my delegation that we may be able to broaden this area of progress. The problem of conventional arms is of particular concern to the smaller nations and I would hope that they could join with us in exploring this question more deeply and arriving at solutions that will be satisfactory both to them and to all of us.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) : Owing to the lateness of the hour I should like, with the agreement of my colleagues, to postpone to a subsequent meeting the intervention I had intended to make. But there are one or two very brief remarks which I do feel concerned to make now. To its regret, my delegation has had occasion previously to protest against the introduction by the Soviet Union into the proceedings of this Conference of a tone of polemics and hostility which seems to us absolutely contrary to the whole spirit of disarmament. Today the representative of the Soviet Union, no doubt perhaps carried away by the heat and warmth of argument, allowed himself to say that the United States planned to carry out its aggressive intentions by using its European allies. At least that is how it came to me in the interpretation.

As the representative here of a country which is a friend and ally of the United States, and proud to be so, I could not pass over a statement of that kind without raising my voice in dissent. But even if my delegation were not representing a country that is a friend and ally of the United States -- if I were representing an uncommitted country -- I would still feel constrained to express my regret at the introduction into our proceedings of reckless statements of that kind and at the resort to the tactics of impugning the motives of other delegations. It seems to me entirely contrary to the spirit of friendly discussion, to the desire for friendly agreement and to the desire for moderation and restraint with which my delegation comes to this table.

The CHAIRMAN (India) : Would the representative of Italy like to speak now, or later ?

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French) : As it is so late, I shall speak at the next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (India) : The representative of the Soviet Union has asked to be allowed to exercise his right of reply. Does he wish to do so now or later ?

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) : I have asked for the floor in order to exercise my right of reply and to clarify one of the remarks made by Mr. Dean. After my statement, Mr. Dean said that the Defence Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Malinowsky, in connexion with the successful completion of the combined flight of the two cosmonauts, had made

(Mr. Kuznetsov, (USSR))

a statement containing a threat to the United States. I should like to inform the Committee that no such statement was made by Marshal Malinowsky.

In connexion with Air Force Day, which was to be observed on 18 August, the Minister of Defence of the USSR issued an order which was published in the Soviet newspaper Pravda on 18 August. In this order there is not a single word to the effect which Mr. Dean mentioned. I should like, however, to quote one passage from it :

"This day is being observed in the circumstances of the successful struggle of the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, for the implementation of the great programme of construction of communism, adopted at the twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and for strengthening peace and friendship between all peoples."

Mr. DEAN (United States of America) : I want to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his advice that Marshal Malinowsky made no such statements, but unfortunately, under the dateline 16 August various newspapers did carry stories from Moscow quoting Malinowsky as saying : "Let our enemies know what techniques and what soldiers our Soviet power possesses." I can show my Soviet colleague, if he so desires, many dispatches which I think substantiate what I have said. If those dispatches are incorrect, I am very glad to know it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique :

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-fourth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lall, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 27 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.